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  Can	  the	  World	  Market	  Reproduce	  its	  
own	  Institutional	  Prerequisites?	  
Abstract:	  Markets	  are	  not	  a	  natural	  phenomenon	  but	  depend	  on	  a	  complex	  set	  of	  institutions.	  
Commercial	  law	  enables	  and	  facilitates	  at-­‐arm’s-­‐length	  market	  exchange.	  Competition	  law	  
regulates	  freedom	  of	  contract	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  it	  from	  self-­‐abolition.	  On	  the	  domestic	  level,	  
these	  core	  pillars	  of	  the	  economic	  constitution	  have	  been	  safely	  installed	  by	  the	  modern	  nation	  
state.	  However,	  on	  the	  global	  level	  the	  situation	  is	  different.	  Since	  in	  contrast	  to	  domestic	  
trade,	  cross-­‐border	  transactions	  are	  not	  conducted	  “in	  the	  shadow	  of	  law”	  but	  largely	  depend	  
on	  private	  governance-­‐mechanisms,	  the	  crucial	  question	  is	  whether	  the	  world	  market	  is	  able	  to	  
reproduce	  its	  own	  institutional	  prerequisites.	  Consequently,	  we	  assess	  the	  potential	  effects	  of	  
this	  privatization	  of	  commercial	  law	  on	  competition	  policy,	  namely	  the	  potential	  abuse	  of	  
market-­‐dominating	  positions	  resulting	  from	  a	  rise	  in	  the	  level	  of	  vertical	  integration	  on	  the	  
world	  market	  as	  well	  as	  the	  potential	  of	  contracting	  around	  the	  ban	  on	  cartels	  by	  choosing	  
arbitration	  rather	  than	  litigation	  as	  a	  means	  of	  commercial	  dispute	  resolution.	  
Key	  words:	  private	  law,	  contract	  enforcement,	  economic	  constitution,	  cross-­‐border	  contracts,	  
competition	  policy,	  vertical	  integration,	  international	  arbitration,	  private	  ordering,	  antitrust	  
1 * This article is based on the authors’ joint research conducted within the framework of the Collaborative Research 
Center 597 "Transformations of the State" in Bremen (http://www.staat.uni-bremen.de/?SPRACHE=en). It 
especially builds on work published in the following articles: Calliess/Mertens, Transnational Corporations, global 
Competition Policy, and the Shortcomings of Private International Law, Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 18 (2011) p. 843-
872; Calliess/Renner, The Public and the Private Dimensions of Transnational Commercial Law, German L. J. 10 
(2009) 10, p. 1341-1356; Renner, Towards a Hierarchy of Norms in Transnational Law?, J. Int'l Arb. 26 (2009) 4, p. 
533-555 
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Gralf-Peter Calliess, Jens Mertens, Moritz Renner* 
“Commerce ... can seldom flourish long in any state ..., in which the faith of contracts is not supported by law ...” 
Adam Smith2
“The inability of societies to develop effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts is the most 
important source of both historical stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment …” 
Douglass C. North3
INTRODUCTION	  
Markets are a result of social organization rather than a natural phenomenon. Commerce, defined 
as the marketing of goods and services, is dependent on a complex set of institutions among 
which commercial and competition law figure quite prominently. Commercial law, understood 
as a set of efficacious institutions for the enforcement of contracts, enables and facilitates at-
arm’s-length market exchange. Competition law, consisting of a ban on cartels, a prohibition of 
the abuse of dominant positions, and merger control, regulates freedom of contract in order to 
protect it from self-abolition. Taken together, commercial and competition law make up the core 
pillar of what was called the ‘economic constitution’ of market economies by German ordo-
liberalism.4 Historically, the evolution of the economic constitution was tied to the nation state, 
and in case of the European internal market to the EU supranational legal system as backed by 
the Member States. After globalization, which entity provides the economic constitution of the 
world market? The WTO might be a candidate, but for now does not qualify as a provider of 
commercial and competition law. In the absence of a world state as a regulator, can the world 
market produce its own economic constitution by means of private ordering? 
Indeed, many scholars claim that the global economy has generated private legal regimes for 
the enforcement of contracts, e.g. the New Law Merchant as a transnational commercial law.5 
* This article is based on the authors’ joint research conducted within the framework of the Collaborative Research
Center 597 "Transformations of the State" in Bremen (http://www.staat.uni-bremen.de/?SPRACHE=en). It 
especially builds on work published in the following articles: Calliess/Mertens, Transnational Corporations, global 
Competition Policy, and the Shortcomings of Private International Law, Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 18 (2011) p. 843-
872; Calliess/Renner, The Public and the Private Dimensions of Transnational Commercial Law, German L. J. 10 
(2009) 10, p. 1341-1356; Renner, Towards a Hierarchy of Norms in Transnational Law?, J. Int'l Arb. 26 (2009) 4, p. 
533-555. 
2 An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations II, 1778, p. 539 f. 
3 Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 1990, p. 54 
4 Böhm, Wettbewerb und Monopolkampf. Eine Untersuchung zur Frage des wirtschaftlichen Kampfrechts und zur 
Frage der rechtlichen Struktur der geltenden Wirtschaftsordnung, 1933; Behrens, Weltwirtschaftsverfassung, 
Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie 19 (2000) p. 5-27. 
5 Teubner, 'Global Bukowina': Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in: Teubner (ed), Global Law without a State, 
1997, p. 3; Berger, The creeping codification of the lex mercatoria, 1999; Stone Sweet, The New Lex Mercatoria 
and Transnational Governance, Journal of European Public Policy 13 (2006) p. 627-646; Calliess, Transnational 
Civil Regimes: Economic Globalisation and the Evolution of Commercial Law, in: Gessner (ed), Contractual 
Certainty in International Trade - Empirical Studies and Theoretical Debates on Institutional Support for Global 
Economic Exchanges, 2009, p. 215-238; Calliess et al., Transformations of Commercial Law: New Forms of Legal 
Certainty for Globalized Exchange Processes?, in: Hurrelmann et al. (ed), Transforming the Golden Age Nation 
State, 2007, p. 83-108. 
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Moreover, Gunther Teubner suggests that such private regimes are subject to auto-constitutional 
processes which enable them to reflect public policy considerations.6 In the context of the 
economic constitution, this would imply that private actors on ‘the law market’7 do not only 
provide efficacious contract enforcement institutions, but also that they are able to prevent 
contracting parties from distorting competition through cartel agreements, for example. So are 
‘merchants of law’ also acting as ‘moral entrepreneurs’8 when it comes to competition policy as 
a public good?  
In this article we intend to analyze in some detail the potential anti-competitive effects of a 
privatization of commercial law and we discuss to what extent the self-constitutionalization of 
private regimes may be understood as a privatization of competition law. In a first step, we will 
argue that the institutional organization of cross-border commerce differs in fundamental ways 
from what we know from domestic markets due to the lower level of legal certainty created by 
the state legal system. Secondly, we will illustrate how international traders adapt to these 
differences by employing private governance mechanisms such as vertical integration (uniform 
governance) or international commercial arbitration (trilateral governance) in order to support 
their trade. Thirdly, we will assess the potential effects of this privatization of commercial law on 
competition policy, namely the potential abuse of market-dominating positions resulting from a 
rise in the level of vertical integration on the world market as well as the potential of contracting 
around the ban on cartels by choosing arbitration rather than litigation as a means of commercial 
dispute resolution. 
QUALITY	   OF	   COMMERCIAL	   LAW	   AS	   CRUCIAL	   FACTOR	   FOR	   THE	   INSTITUTIONAL	  
ORGANIZATION	  OF	  COMMERCE	  
Institutions are the foundation of economic exchange. Prominently defined by Douglass C. North 
as “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, […] the humanly devised constraints 
that shape human interaction”9, institutions allow economic actors to predict the behaviour of 
potential trade partners, turning uncertainty into calculable risk and thus allowing transactions to 
take place. What kind of institutions a society will develop, however, is largely dependent on 
external factors. In the following sections we will show that due to the deficiencies of private law 
on the international level, the ‘society of traders’ engaged in cross-border commerce has 
developed institutions different from those employed in domestic trade, calling for differentiated 
considerations as far as competition in international market structures is concerned. 
6 Teubner, Global Private Regimes: Neo-spontaneous Law and Dual Constitution of Autonomous Sectors in World 
Society, in: Teubner/Ladeur (ed), Globalization and Public Governance, 2004, p. 71  ; Teubner, Constitutional 
Fragments. Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization, 2012.  
7 O'Hara/Ribstein, The law market, 2009. 
8 Dezalay/Garth, Merchants of Law as Moral Entrepreneurs: Constructing International Justice from the 
Competition for Transnational Business Disputes, Law & Society Review 29 (1995) 1, p. 27. 
9 North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 1990, at p. 3. For more specific information 
on the role of institutions in cross-border trade cf. to Dietz, Institutionen und Globalisierung – Eine empirische 
Untersuchung am Beispiel grenzüberschreitender Softwareentwicklungsverträge, 2010. 
5                          PRIVATIZING THE ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION	  
Deficient	  contract-­‐enforcement	  and	  protection	  of	  property	  rights	  in	  international	  trade	  
Transactions are always threatened by uncertainty, resulting from the opportunistic behaviour of 
human beings. Only if payment and delivery happen simultaneously, no further institutional 
embedding of a transaction seems necessary. However, in a modern society based on the division 
of labour and credit, it is inevitable that goods and services are exchanged across large distances 
and time spans. With no direct means of control left, any party making an advance delivery or 
payment risks losing its transaction input, since for the other party it is the economically most 
reasonable behaviour to refrain from making delivery or payment and thus to double profits. 
Because of this risk, no party will move in advance. Consequently, the transaction will not take 
place at all. 
In order to overcome this so-called ‘prisoner's dilemma’, a party which moves in advance 
must be able to expect with sufficient certainty that its counterpart will fulfil its contractual 
obligations. Within the modern nation state, this protection is granted by a judicial system that 
creates legal certainty with regard to the enforcement of contracts. Acting “in the shadow of 
law”,10 traders have a strong incentive to fulfil their contractual obligations since the costs of 
losing a lawsuit exceed the gain from cheating.11 The enforcement of contracts and the protection 
of property rights – in short commercial law – thus form part of the economic constitution 
allowing economic exchange between anonymous parties. Commercial law, therefore, is a 
prerequisite for the emergence of competitive market structures. 
However, in the absence of a ‘world state’, there is no supranational world private law regime 
that would generate a similar level of contractual certainty for cross-border trade. The judicial 
settling of conflicts concerning cross-border transactions, therefore, poses always three 
questions: (1) Which nation’s courts are responsible for resolving the conflict? (2) Which 
national contract law are these courts supposed to apply in resolving the conflict? (3) Is a 
judgment from one nation state recognized and enforced in another nation state?12 
In theory, these issues are addressed by private international law (PIL). Contrary to the 
wording, however, PIL does not represent international uniform law. Rather, each state’s legal 
system has its own conflict of laws provisions. Although the idea of a global private law based 
on contracts under international law emerged already at the end of the 19th century,13 more than 
a century of work in different international organizations, such as the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law (since 1893), the International Institute for the Unification of Private 
Law (UNIDROIT, since 1926) and the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL, since 1966), have only produced piecemeal results, like the UN Convention on the 
International Sale of Goods (CISG) of 1980.14 Hence, the transacting parties are confronted with 
a plethora of different conflict of laws rules and substantive norms. They cannot rely on 
enforcement by state courts, as there is still no global agreement on the recognition and 
                                                
10 Cf. to Dixit, Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance, 2004, at p. 10. 
11 For an in-depth analysis of the function of a state-organized private law system cf. to Mertens, Privatrechtsschutz 
und vertikale Integration im internationalen Handel, 2011, at p. 31 et seq.  
12 Calliess, The Making of Transnational Contract Law, Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 14 (2007) 2, p. 469-483 (473) 
with further references. 
13 Zitelmann, Die Möglichkeit eines Weltrechts, Allgemeine österreichische Gerichts-Zeitung 39 (1888) p. 193. 
14 For the CISG see Ferrari, Quo Vadis CISG? : Celebrating the 25th Anniversary of the United Nations Convention 
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 2005. 
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enforcement of judgments.15 Rather, domestic courts control autonomously whether a foreign 
judgment is in conformity with public policy. At least in Europe, these issues have partly been 
mitigated due to intensive integration efforts.16 On the global scale, however, the problems 
remain largely unresolved.  
In sum, the economic constitution for the world market lacks a functioning commercial law 
component. The resulting ‘constitutional uncertainty’17 on the international level causes 
additional transaction costs which often make the unassisted market unavailable as a form of 
organizing cross-border transactions.18 
 
Private	  ordering	  as	  the	  institutional	  basis	  of	  cross-­‐border	  trade	  
As a reaction, traders engaged in cross-border commerce have developed a variety of private 
governance mechanisms as functional equivalents to a state-organized private law system. It is 
not a question whether trade works without the protection of a state-organized private law 
system; it is only a question of how and how well it works. Not only in the modern age, but 
throughout history traders have managed to protect transactions in a way sufficient to allow 
economic exchange. There are a great number of studies on the ancient Lex Mercatoria or 
medieval Law Merchant supporting this fact.19 More recently, research covered a variety of 
                                                
15 For the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters of 2005, 
which has still not taken effect, cf. to Baumgartner, The proposed Hague Convention on jurisdiction and foreign 
judgments : trans-atlantic lawmaking for transnational litigation, 2003. 
16 Especially through the Council Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels I - Regulation), OJ 12/1, the Convention of 16 September 1988 
on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Lugano Convention), the 
Commision Regulation 805/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 creating a 
European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims, the Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual 
obligations, adopted on 19 June 1980, and the Commission Regulation 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) coming into effect in 
December 2009 and the Commission Regulation 1206/2001 on cooperation between the courts of the Member States 
in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters. 
17 Schmidt-Trenz/Schmidtchen, Private international trade in the shadow of the territoriality of law : why does it 
work?, Southern Econ. J. 58 (1991) p. 329-338 (331). 
18 In this vein already Schmidtchen/Schmidt-Trenz, Private Law, The World Production Possibility Frontier and the 
Need for an International "Private Law Community": German Theory of Order and Constitutional Economics at 
Work, 1989, at p. 34: ‘[...] trades between ’faceless buyers and sellers’ [...] hardly work in international trade. They 
require a developed legal system and protective safeguard which we encounter only in an ideal domestic economy.’ 
Cf. also Rühl, Effizienzprobleme bei grenzüberschreitenden Rechtsstreitigkeiten, German Working Papers in Law 
and Economics (2008) , at p. 6: ‘Constitutional uncertainty caused by the plurality of law can prevent rationally 
acting parties from concluding cross-border transactions and, hence, lead to the failure of these transactions; whereas 
national transactions would not fail.’ 
19 Among the most popular are: Greif, Reputation and coalitions in medieval trade : evidence on the Maghribi 
traders, J. Econ. Hist. 49 (1989) 4, p. 857; Greif, The organization of long-distance trade : reputation and coalitions 
in the Geniza documents and Genoa during the eleventh and the twelfth centuries, J. Econ. Hist. 51 (1989) No. 2, p. 
459-462; Greif, The fundamental problem of exchange: A research agenda in Historical Institutional Analysis, 
Europ. Rev. Econ. Hist. 4 (2000) 3, p. 251-284; Greif, Institutions and the path to modern economy: Lessons from 
medieval trade, 2006; North, Institutions, transaction costs, and the rise of merchant empires, in: Tracy (ed), The 
Political Economy of Merchant Empires, 1991, p. 22-40; Milgrom et al., The Role of Institutions in the Revival of 
Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, Econ. Politics 2  (1990) 1, p. 1-23; Clay, 
Trade Without Law: Private-Order Institutions in Mexican California, J.L. Econ. & Org. 13 (1997) 1, p. 202-231.  
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private governance mechanisms employed in modern cross-border trade. Relational contracts, 
trade intermediaries and trade clubs, letters of credit, arbitration tribunals and unilateral control 
through firm structures are just a selection of popular instruments.20 
Recent empirical data confirms that in international trade the case-load of commercial courts is 
by far lower than in domestic trade.21 As a general rule it can be said that in international trade 
the relative weight of public governance mechanisms decreases while the importance of private 
governance mechanisms increases when compared to domestic trade. 
 
GLOBAL	   ECONOMIC	   CONSTITUTION	   OUTSIDE	   THE	   “SHADOW	   OF	   LAW”	   –	   CAN	  
PRIVATE	  ORDERING	  SUPPORT	  GLOBAL	  COMPETITIVE	  MARKET	  STRUCTURES?	  
So how does this shift towards private governance affect the economic constitution of global 
markets? In the following sections we will discuss two concerns which put into question whether 
private ordering is able to reproduce the elements of the economic constitution necessary for 
competitive market structures on the global level. Firstly, the deficiencies of state-organized 
commercial law influence market structures, namely causing an elevated extent of vertical 
integration and thus reinforcing the danger of abuse of dominant positions. Secondly, private 
governance mechanisms are prone to neglect matters of public interest in favour of private 
interests. Specifically, we will ponder the question whether by choosing arbitration instead of 
litigation international traders are able to contract around the ban on cartels. 
Vertical	  integration	  –	  An	  inevitable	  consequence	  of	  private	  ordering	  
Vertical integration is the competition law issue which is most closely related to the choice of 
governance mechanisms. As we will show, any sort of private ordering necessarily implies 
vertical integration. In order to explain this relationship, we will use the theoretical model of 
transaction costs economics (TCE).22 
 
                                                
20 See Calliess et al., Transformations of Commercial Law: New Forms of Legal Certainty for Globalized Exchange 
Processes?, in: Hurrelmann et al. (ed), Transforming the Golden Age Nation State, 2007, p. 83-108; 
Dietz/Nieswandt, The Emergence of Transnational Cooperation in the Software Industry, in: Gessner (ed), 
Contractual Certainty in International Trade - Empirical Studies and Theoretical Debates on Institutional Support 
for Global Economic Exchanges, 2009, p. 87-106; Dietz, Institutionen und Globalisierung – Eine empirische 
Untersuchung am Beispiel grenzüberschreitender Softwareentwicklungsverträge, 2010, at p. 65 ff; Sosa, Cross-
Border Dispute Resolution from the Perspective of Mid-sized Law Firms - The Example of International 
Commercial Arbitration, in: Gessner (ed), Contractual Certainty in International Trade - Empirical Studies and 
Theoretical Debates on Institutional Support for Global Economic Exchanges, 2009, p. 107-156; Konradi, The Role 
of Lex Mercatoria in Supporting Globalised Transactions: An Empirical Insight into the Governance Structure of the 
Timber Industry, in: Gessner (ed), Contractual Certainty in International Trade - Empirical Studies and Theoretical 
Debates on Institutional Support for Global Economic Exchanges, 2009, p. 49-86. 
21 Hoffmann, Schiedsgerichte als Gewinner der Globalisierung? - Eine empirische Analyse zur Bedeutung 
staatlicher und privater Gerichtsbarkeit für den internationalen Handel, SchiedsVZ (2010) p. 96-101, at p. 100; 
Hoffmann/Maurer, Entstaatlichung der Justiz - Empirische Belege zum Bedeutungsverlust staatlicher Gerichte für 
internationale Wirtschaftsstreitigkeiten, ZfRSoz 31 (2010) p. 279-302. 
22 For more details on the model cf. to Williamson, Transaction-cost economics : the governance of contractual 
relations, J. L. & Econ. 22 (1979) 2, p. 233-261 and Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics, in: Ménard/Shirley 
(ed), Handbook of New Institutional Economics, 2005, p. 41-65. 
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Private ordering, vertical integration, and the assumption of efficient market 
structures: why common theory fails on global markets 
Based on the ‘make-or-buy’ decision, TCE analyzes the costs which arise when goods or 
services are transferred from one economic unit to another. ‘Make-or-buy’ characterizes the 
extreme points of a continuum of governance mechanisms which can be used to organize a 
transaction. On the one hand, an economic actor can ‘make’ a good or service itself, i.e. 
completely integrate the production and/or distribution process into its own firm structure. On 
the other hand, it can ‘buy’ the good or service externally from a third party on the market. What 
distinguishes ‘market’ from ‘firm’ is the way control is exerted. In a firm, no external actors are 
involved. Rather, there are only internal transactions between different sub-units of the same 
firm or corporate group, governed by means of hierarchy, i.e. a command-and-control structure 
based on property rights. On the market, in contrast, there is no such control over the 
counterparty of a transaction because both parties are completely independent from each other, 
i.e. ‘at arm’s length’-trade.  
However, actors are not bound to the extremes of market or firm. They may also combine 
elements of both, forming ‘hybrid’ governance mechanisms. Graphically, the spectrum of 
possible modes of governance for transactions can be depicted as a straight line from market to 
firm with an infinite number of combinations of both mechanisms in between. Any form of 
private ordering means departing from market governance and moving towards the firm. 
Consequently, it also means employing elements of the way a firm exerts control over 
transactions. Thus, hybrid governance mechanisms always include elements of dependency and 
subordination as weaker forms of the hierarchy and orders employed in the firm.  
In principle, there are three options to stabilize transactions this way.23 First, actors can create 
dependency by enlarging the number of actors involved in a transaction, so a party defecting 
from its contractual obligations will face sanctions by third parties, e.g. a loss in reputation. 
Second, actors can bundle multiple transaction issues, so the counterpart will be bound to its 
obligations in order to gain the profit from all transactions. Third, business relations can be 
stretched over time, creating long-term dependencies between the actors. Moreover, these 
instruments can be combined in order to maximize effects. No matter if relational contracts, trade 
clubs, or reputation networks are analyzed: all of these mechanisms are based on the said 
instruments creating a certain level of dependency and/or subordination as elements of vertical 
integration. 
Influenced by the ideas of the so called Chicago School,24 modern competition policy employs 
TCE’s ‘make-or-buy’-model to support its assessment that vertical integration is per se 
beneficial.25 Depending on the factors specificity, uncertainty, and frequency, it is argued that for 
each transaction a certain governance mechanism in between market and firm is most suitable, 
                                                
23 This categorization goes back to the model of Yarbrough/Yarbrough, The Contractual Role of Boundaries: Law 
and Economics Meets International Organization, Europ. J. Int. Relat. 9 (2003) 4, p. 543-590 (551). 
24 For the main ideas of this school cf. to Bork, The antitrust paradox : a policy at war with itself, 1978 and Posner, 
The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, U. Pa. L. Rev. 127 (1979) p. 925-948. 
25 As one example out of many, this becomes obvious in the Commission Regulation 2790/1999 on the application 
of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, OJ L 336/21, especially 
in recital 6. 
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i.e. offers the best compromise between the benefits and disadvantages of either extreme. 
Markets on the one hand offer low costs of organization and ideal incentives for the actors 
involved, but on the other hand allow no control over the counterpart’s behaviour. The firm, in 
contrast, offers a maximum of control but suffers from high bureaucratic costs and low 
incentives. It is concluded that any governance mechanism chosen to organize a certain 
transaction must be the most efficient instrument, for if the compromise between market and 
firm elements was not ideal, it would eventually be crowded out by the force of competition. As 
a macroeconomic consequence, it is argued that due to the pressure of competition the benefits 
gained from this efficient choice of governance mechanisms will eventually be passed on to the 
consumer. 
However, this reasoning is conclusive only under circumstances found within modern nation 
states. The ‘make-or-buy’-model takes for granted an institutional framework which grants free 
choice between the market and the firm. But this is the case only if there is a system of private 
law which reliably protects property rights and enforces contracts. As on the free market actors 
are not able to exert any influence on the counterpart’s behaviour, market governance is 
dependent on an external governance mechanism safeguarding transactions. Such external 
protection is guaranteed by the private law systems which developed nation states provide for 
domestic trade, but – as shown above – not for cross-border trade.26 Outside the ‘shadow of law’, 
actors in cross-border trade are forced to revert to private governance-mechanisms and thus use 
means of vertical integration. Consequently, the level of vertical integration in cross-border 
transactions will be higher than in domestic trade, given that all other factors – i.e. the frequency, 
uncertainty and specificity of transactions – remain unchanged.  
What implications does this have on the assessment of vertical integration? Looking at single 
transactions it is true that vertical integration is indeed efficient. In fact, in situations where there 
is no system of private law enabling market transactions, private ordering and thus vertical 
integration is the only way to organize economic exchange. However, this does not support the 
conclusion that vertical integration is beneficial in general. Rather, from a macro-economical 
point of view, the elevated level of vertical integration on global markets is quite alarming. Due 
to the euphoria about the efficiency advantages of vertical integration, its costs and incentive 
disadvantages vis-à-vis markets are neglected. Control is costly. Hybrid governance mechanisms 
such as letters of credit or arbitration entail significant additional transaction costs. Trade clubs 
and trade intermediaries take commissions. Even to the extent that international trade is 
safeguarded by a transaction-specific mélange of public and private governance mechanisms,27 
already in the negotiation phase significant transaction costs arise through the involvement of 
international law firms. Moreover, vertical integration abolishes market incentives and causes 
friction within the organizational apparatus (‘X-Inefficiency’).  
Due to these disadvantages, O. E. Williamson – one of the leading TCE scholars – called the 
firm-internal conduct of transactions the organizational form of last resort. He gives clear 
guidance: “try markets, try hybrids, and have recourse to the firm only when all else fails.”28 
Vertical integration is economically beneficial only if the specificity, uncertainty and frequency 
                                                
26 In this vein also Dixit, Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance, 2004, at p. 3: ‘Thus 
conventional economic theory does not underestimate the importance of law; rather, the problem is that it takes the 
existence of a well-functioning institution of state law for granted.’ 
27 See Calliess et al., Transformations of Commercial Law: New Forms of Legal Certainty for Globalized Exchange 
Processes?, in: Hurrelmann et al. (ed), Transforming the Golden Age Nation State, 2007, p. 83-108. 
28 Williamson, The economics of governance, Amer. Econ. Rev. 95 (2005) 2, p. 1-18 (12). 
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of transactions justify the high level of time and effort used. Otherwise market governance is the 
more attractive organizational form, as it allows a leaner internal administration and offers 
optimal incentive structures through competition. 
Not only in theory, but also in economic practice it can be observed that economic actors 
recognize and utilize the advantages of a low level of vertical integration if circumstances allow 
them to do so. In order to save administrative costs and to gain flexibility, corporations tend to 
decouple activities outside of their core competencies from the hierarchy of the firm and to 
transfer them to other companies by virtue of outsourcing and off-shoring. However, economic 
studies demonstrate that corporations tend to outsource only into those countries in which legal 
institutions provide for an efficacious enforcement of contracts.29 
To sum up, vertical integration does enable global economic exchange – but only at high costs. 
Via the final price for any good or service provided across borders, the consumer pays the profit 
margin of providers of private governance mechanisms. Against this background, vertical 
integration is not per se beneficial, but may have been chosen as an inferior type of governance 
mechanism only because market governance was unavailable due to the deficits of the 
international private law system. The tailor-made governance solutions of transnational 
commerce lack the economies of scale that a state-organized private law regime offers as 
safeguarding mechanism for the multitude of relatively unspecific transactions.30 Thus, for the 
sake of a conclusive assessment of vertical integration, it is not enough to lean back and be 
comfortable with the lax treatment in competition law. 
 
No comprehensive remedy for vertically concentrated market structures to be 
expected  
A solution to this problem seems hard to reach in practice, though. Adopting stricter competition 
rules vis-à-vis vertical integration would be counterproductive: due to the deficits of private law 
on the international level private ordering, and thus vertical integration, is the only mechanism 
enabling cross-border trade. Theoretically, only improvements of international commercial law 
as part of a world economic constitution – i.e. the protection of property rights and the 
enforcement of contracts across national borders as those parts of the economic constitution 
necessary for the emergence of market economies – would tackle the root of the problem.31 
However, so far all the dreams of a world private law have been disappointed, though – provided 
                                                
29 Grossman/Helpman, Outsourcing in a Global Economy, Rev. Econ. Stud. 72 (2005) 1, p. 135-159; Nunn, 
Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern of Trade, Q. J. Econ. 122 (2007) 2, p. 569-600. 
30 Dietz, Institutionen und Globalisierung – Eine empirische Untersuchung am Beispiel grenzüberschreitender 
Softwareentwicklungsverträge, 2010, Chap. 2, point 4.2. 
31 Cf. to Behrens, Weltwirtschaftsverfassung, JNPÖ 19 (2000) p. 5-27; For background information on the model of 
an economic constitution cf. to Kerber/Vanberg, Constitutional Aspects of Party Autonomy and Its Limits - The 
Perspective of Constitutional Economics, in: Grundmann et al. (ed), Party autonomy and the role of information in 
the internal market, 2001, p. 49-79; Behrens, Die Bedeutung des Kollisionsrechts für die "Globalisierung" der 
Wirtschaft, in: Basedow et al. (ed), Aufbruch nach Europa: 75 Jahre Max-Planck-Institut für Privatrecht, 2001, p. 
381-398 (384 et seq.). 
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the political will – at least partial improvements would be possible.32 Success stories like the 
European Union show that unifying legal systems across national borders can work in practice. 
On the global level, however, no similar development is in sight. Against the background of 
diverse national interests and judicial conflicts, at least in the closer future no comprehensive 
approach has any realistic chance to succeed. 
 
International	  arbitration	  –	  An	  instrument	  able	  to	  support	  competitive	  structures	  on	  the	  world	  market?	  
Even if national systems of private law cannot sufficiently protect international transactions, 
does not international commercial arbitration offer a viable solution to conduct trade between 
anonymous parties across borders and thus allow cross-border market governance? 
 
Arbitration as an instrument partially enabling cross-border market trade 
Frequently relied on in international trade, arbitration indeed serves the same function as state-
based court systems as far as facilitating trade is concerned. Contractually equipped with 
jurisdictional powers for a specific transaction, arbitral tribunals serve as independent third 
parties resolving the prisoner’s dilemma between anonymous actors. Most importantly, the 
enforcement of the tribunals’ decisions does not necessarily have to rely on dependency and 
subordination, as is usually inherent to private ordering. Rather, decisions are enforceable via the 
nation states’ private law systems: Having ratified the so called 1958 New York Convention, 
most countries enforce decisions of arbitral tribunals via the apparatus of their private law 
systems with only very limited options of de novo review of the decision. 
It must be kept in mind, however, that due to several shortcomings arbitration does not offer the 
same universal kind of protection as guaranteed by state-based private law systems. Whereas the 
latter are accessible for any sort of claims, international arbitration favours economically 
powerful players and high-value transactions.33 This mainly results from the relatively high costs 
of arbitration procedures.34 Paying extremely high fees for arbitrators and councils alike – mostly 
lawyers from international law firms with hourly wages well beyond 350 € – is reasonable only, 
if justified by the sum at stake. Empirical research shows that a small claim procedure in front of 
state courts costs only a fraction of what the same procedure in arbitration.35 While access to 
justice in front of public courts is granted by constitutional law, e.g. Article 6 ECHR, and backed 
by legal aid for destitute parties, arbitral tribunals will deny opening procedures if a party is not 
able to make an advance payment for the expected costs.  
Further, two additional structural deficits of arbitration limit its institutional reach. First, arbitral 
tribunals often do not publish their awards. Thus, arbitration does not allow for the production of 
legal certainty for third parties which is a by-product of judicial precedent. Second, arbitral 
                                                
32 A plethora of suggestions for improving the state protection of private law can be found in Calliess/Hoffmann, 
Effektive Justizdienstleistungen für den globalen Handel, ZRP (2009) p. 1-4. 
33 For an extensive analysis of the role of international arbitration for small and medium-sized enterprises cf. to 
Parise-Kuhnle, Transaktionssicherheit im Außenhandel durch prozessualen Rechtsschutz – eine Untersuchung aus 
der Perspektive kleiner und mittelständischer Unternehmen, CRC 597 „Transformations of the State“ Working 
Paper Series, forthcoming. 
34 For the cost structure of arbitration cf. to Schütze, Schiedsgericht und Schiedsverfahren, 2007, at p. 12; Henn, 
Schiedsverfahrensrecht - Handbuch für die Praxis, 2000, at p. 194 et seq.; Hoffmann, Nationale Ziviljustiz und 
internationaler Handelsverkehr – ein Vorschlag zur Einrichtung von Kammern für internationale Handelssachen, 
Dissertation Bremen, 2010, at p. 52 et seq. 
35 Lachmann, Handbuch für die Schiedsgerichtspraxis, 2008, marginal numbers 4682 et seq. 
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wards are final and binding, i.e. there are no stages of appeal involved in which decisions are 
reviewed in substance for their overall consistency and coherency. This lack of control makes 
arbitration prone to biased and unpredictable decisions, calling into question the fairness of the 
proceedings. Without any objective control according to common legal standards, arbitrators 
might be tempted to render the decision most favourable to economically powerful parties 
because as repeat players they will most probably be able to channel future arbitration business 
to them. For experienced lawyers it is easy to justify any outcome of the proceedings in a way 
that is not contestable by the very limited means of control of national courts over arbitral 
awards. Since it takes a violation of domestic public policy in order to successfully contest an 
arbitral award in front of a state court, such proceedings are rarely successful. Whereas 
economically powerful players have the capacity to cope with the resulting unpredictability, the 
risks might be too high for small and medium-sized enterprises facing bankruptcy in case of 
unfavourable awards.36 
To sum up, arbitration is neither accessible to the broad public, nor does it grant a level of justice 
comparable to a state-organized system of private law. Nevertheless, arbitration supported by 
public enforcement via the 1958 New York Convention is able to lay the foundation for at arm’s 
length market transactions at least for economically powerful, repeat players. In this limited 
respect, international arbitration does indeed enable market transactions between independent 
and anonymous trade partners on the global level.  
 
 
Private vs. public interest: Is arbitration able and willing to protect the 
antitrust law? 
If arbitration enables cross-border trade between anonymous parties and thus allows for 
competitive international market structures, then why should it raise any issues as far as 
competition law is concerned? In order to answer this question one needs to look at the different 
interests involved in the governance of transactions. 
Primarily, private governance mechanisms serve the interests of the transacting parties. They are 
functional equivalents to state-organized private law systems as far as the trade-facilitative 
function is concerned. Arbitrators, for instance, offer services as professional trade facilitators: 
they are engaged and paid for by the transacting parties and render their award in order to 
enforce contractual obligations. In other words, they are primarily bound to the private interests 
of the transacting parties as their customers. 
The protection of competition, however, is a goal of public interest. Competition law forms part 
of regulatory law limiting individual freedom in order to achieve better economic results for the 
public. Thus, at least from an ex-ante point of view it usually runs counter to the interests of 
private parties involved in a certain transaction. As public institutions, state courts have to 
consider both the facilitative and the regulatory aspects of private law. While enforcing 
                                                
36 For further details on the relation between the economic power of the parties and their access to arbitration cf. to 
Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, Fordham L. Rev. 71 (2002-2003) p. 761-
798 (781); Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory Consumer Arbitration, Law & Contemp. Probs. 67 (2004) p. 133, 
161; Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Contingent Fee Contracts, SSRN Working Paper (2005) . 
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commercial contracts and protecting property rights, at the same time they have to exercise 
public control functions by limiting the private autonomy of commercial actors with regard to 
public interests and public good.  
It is highly doubtful, however, whether and to what extent arbitral tribunals as private institutions 
have the obligation, capacity, and willingness to take into account matters of public policy. As in 
principle international arbitral tribunals are not bound to apply specific national regulatory rules, 
it comes natural to assume that interests of the public are neglected in favour of the private 
interests of the transaction parties. Already the German Reichsgericht noted that “only an 
unconditional submission under a specific lawmaking authority [...] guarantees that the 
contractual relationship will be regulated, if necessary, against the selfish will of the 
economically stronger partner or of both partners, with regard to those public policy concerns 
that are based on general principles of law.”37 
Some proponents of the New Law Merchant, however, do not agree with these concerns. They 
argue that transnational commercial law not only encompasses substantive legal norms in the 
interest of the contracting parties, but also creates its very own transnational public policy norms. 
Specifically, Gunther Teubner has proposed the idea that private governance regimes are bound 
to ‘auto-constitutionalize’, i.e. to develop a body of higher-ranking norms functionally equivalent 
to national constitutional law.38 Therefore, the argument goes on, the transnationalization of law 
is not per se problematic: Law beyond the state is not necessarily inferior to state-made law when 
it comes to accommodating public policy concerns. From this perspective, transnational law may 
even be depicted as being able to overcome the public/private distinction as such, by way of 
establishing more inclusive processes of regulation that involve both state and non-state, civil 
society actors.39 
A thorough analysis of international arbitral awards reveals that neither the fears nor the hopes 
voiced with regard to public policy in international arbitration are entirely justified. This follows 
from the precarious status of the arbitration regime itself. While international arbitration enjoys a 
high degree of autonomy from domestic legal systems, at the same time it is not wholly 
independent from the state. Arbitral tribunals do not form part of any domestic jurisdiction but 
are still heavily influenced by and dependent on domestic procedural law and state courts. This 
tension goes back to the hybrid character of international arbitration,40 combining privately 
organized tribunals and proceedings with public means of enforcement, as reflected by the 1958 
New York Convention. According to this almost universally ratified convention, on the one 
hand, the autonomy of the private character of the proceedings is respected as all State Parties to 
the Convention must enforce awards rendered by international arbitral tribunals on their territory 
without de novo review as to their substance.41 On the other hand, a certain protection of public 
interests is granted as in a strictly limited number of situations recognition and enforcement may 
be refused, especially if such enforcement were contrary to the public policy of the country 
                                                
37 Reichsgericht, Juristische Wochenschrift (1936), p. 2058 (2059) (our translation).   
38 Teubner, Global Private Regimes: Neo-spontaneous Law and Dual Constitution of Autonomous Sectors in World 
Society, in: Teubner/Ladeur (ed), Globalization and Public Governance, 2004, p. 71  ; Fischer-Lescano/Teubner, 
Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, Michigan Journal of 
International Law 25 (2004) 4, p. 999. 
39 See Teubner, Contracting Worlds: The Many Autonomies of Private Law, Social and Legal Studies 9 (2000) p. 
399-417. 
40 See generally Schlosser, Das Recht der internationalen privaten Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, 1989. 
41 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 
U.N.T.S. 38, at Art. III. 
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where enforcement is sought.42 For the same reason, an arbitral award may be set aside by 
domestic courts under Art. 34 para 2(b)(ii) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration (UNCITRAL Model Law), on which the procedural law concerning 
arbitration is based in most states. Thus, the New York Convention defines both the 
independence and the limits of international arbitration vis-à-vis domestic regulation. While 
based on the will of the parties and the discretion of the arbitrators the tribunal is free to apply 
the law deemed appropriate to satisfy the private interests of the conflict parties, a certain 
protection of public interest is granted by the necessity to render a valid and enforceable award.  
Also the arbitration rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris, the leading 
provider of international commercial arbitration services worldwide, reflect this tension. 
According to Art. 17 para 1 of the ICC Arbitration Rules, “[t]he parties shall be free to agree 
upon the rules of law to be applied by the Arbitral Tribunal to the merits of the dispute. In the 
absence of any such agreement, the Arbitral Tribunal shall apply the rules of law which it 
determines to be appropriate.” Article 35 of the Rules, in contrast, provides that “[i]n all matters 
not expressly provided for in these Rules, the Court and the Arbitral Tribunal shall . . . make 
every effort to make sure that the Award is enforceable at law.” In addition, Art. 6 of the Internal 
Rules of the ICC Court of Arbitration provides that all ICC arbitral awards are scrutinized by the 
ICC’s central administrative body with regard to requirements of the “law of the place of 
arbitration.” 
The tension between autonomy and public oversight in arbitration is reflected on the level of the 
applicable substantive law, specifically with regard to the application of mandatory rules of law. 
In domestic legal systems, mandatory rules of law are norms which cannot be derogated from by 
agreement of the parties – and thus limit party autonomy. This limitation is based on the 
assumption that certain ‘fundamental’ norms must not be left at the parties’ disposal. It is well 
established that state courts, when they enforce commercial contracts and protect property rights, 
at the same time exercise public control functions with regard to (1) public interests or public 
good such as a workable competition or a stable currency, (2) the effects of contracts on third 
parties, e.g. on creditors outside the contractual relationship, and (3) the protection of weaker 
parties within the contract itself, such as the protection of consumers or employees against the 
unilateral exercise of private autonomy by economically dominant actors. 
Even in cross-border disputes, domestic courts apply certain mandatory norms, regardless of the 
law otherwise applicable, as ‘overriding mandatory provisions’ (e.g. Art. 9 Rome I Regulation) 
or with reference to the ‘public policy of the forum’ (e.g. Art. 21 Rome I Regulation). The 
doctrinal reconstruction of such mandatory norms in conflict-of-laws rules widely differs among 
jurisdictions and relies on very diverse doctrinal concepts.43 Usually, the reach of ‘overriding’ 
mandatory provisions, i.e. those mandatory provisions which are applicable to cross-border 
disputes, is considered as more limited than that of ‘ordinary’ mandatory, i.e. purely domestic 
norms: Only those mandatory norms which protect ‘essential regulatory interests’ of the state 
                                                
42 Id. At Art. V para. 2 (b). 
43 For the status of mandatory rules in conflict of laws see especially Guedj, The Theory of the Lois de Police, A 
Functional Trend in Continental Private International Law - A Comparative Analysis with Modern American 
Theories, American Journal of Comparative Law 39 (1991) 4, p. 661-697 as well as Hartley, Mandatory Rules in 
International Contracts: The Common Law Approach, Recueil des Cours 266 (1997) p. 337-426. 
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concerned are applied to cross-border situations.44 Furthermore, there is disagreement as to the 
question whether domestic courts should only apply the overriding mandatory provisions of the 
forum state or also those of third states. Nonetheless, the concept of internationally mandatory 
norms protecting public policy is entrenched in every domestic system of conflict of laws. 
Things become more complicated when it comes to arbitration, though. As arbitral tribunals in 
international cases do not serve as guardians of any national public policy, they are in principle 
not obliged to apply the mandatory rules of any country’s jurisdiction. Rather, as recognized in 
the 1958 New York Convention, arbitration is based on contractual choice-of-law and choice-of-
forum clauses. Consequently, the parties of a contract are free to choose the procedural and 
substantive rules applicable to any potentially arising conflict and thus to ‘opt out of 
regulation’45.  
Classical conflict-of-laws methods for dealing with this problem have proven rather 
unsatisfactory in arbitration as they are deeply rooted in national preconceptions of public policy 
and the fact that domestic courts are bound by a specific national constitutional order. 
International arbitral tribunals, in turn, do not have ties to any specific legal system. Though 
physically seated within a national jurisdiction, it is assumed by most scholars and practitioners 
that arbitral tribunals do not have a forum state. Rather, international arbitral tribunals operate 
delocalized and disconnected from domestic laws and policies. This results in the paradoxical 
situation that for an arbitrator, “there is no foreign law”46 while at the same time, “every law is 
foreign law”.47 
 
Difficulties in the emergence of transnational competition law 
Consequently, there is no clear-cut solution as to the application of mandatory law in 
international arbitration. Still, it is commonly accepted that also in arbitration, matters of public 
policy have to be recognized and protected at least to a certain degree. The question is, however, 
which rules have to be applied in order to grant that protection. 
For international arbitrators confronted with this question there is not much legal guidance. The 
necessity to render an enforceable award forces the arbitrator to take into account the mandatory 
law of nation states potentially involved in the enforcement of the award, at least as far as 
breaches of those rules also lead to a violation of national public policy. The problem is, 
however, that usually it is not possible to predict in which country an award is going to be 
enforced. Acknowledging this difficulty, there have been attempts to develop a system of 
‘transnational public policy’ based on the ground-breaking work of Pierre Lalive48 in order to 
                                                
44 Renner in Calliess (ed.), The Rome Regulations. Commentary on the European Rules of the Conflict of Laws, art. 
9, paras 13-20. 
45 O'Hara, Opting Out of Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis of Contractual Choice of Law, Vanderbilt Law 
Review 53 (2000) p. 1551-1604. 
46 Derains, Public Policy and the Law Applicable to the Dispute in International Arbitration, in: Sanders (ed), 
Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration, 1987, p. 227-256 at p. 232. 
47 Voser, Mandatory Rules of Law as a Limitation on the Law Applicable in International Commercial Arbitration, 
American Review of International Arbitration 7 (1996) 3/4, p. 319 (330). 
48 See Lalive, Ordre public transnational (ou réellement international) et arbitrage internationale, Revue de 
l'arbitrage (1986) p. 327-373; English language version published as Lalive, Transnational (or Truly International) 
Public Policy in International Arbitration, in: Sanders (ed), Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in 
Arbitration, ICCA Congress Series No. 3, 1987, p. 257-318, at p. 286. Similarly, the recommendations of the 
International Law Association Committee on International Commercial Arbitration, Report on Public Policy as a 
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carve out a concept of mandatory norms irrespective of the particularities of national law. 
However, apart from undisputed core elements like the recognition of the jus cogens of 
international law, anti-corruption rules, the principles of universal justice, and a minimum 
standard of human rights, there is no common understanding of which norms form part of 
transnational or truly international public policy. In absence of a ‘world-constitution’ the status 
of normative hierarchies in transnational law remains largely unresolved. 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, some very important domestic courts have expressed high 
expectations as far as specifically the application of competition law by arbitral tribunals is 
concerned. In its famous Mitsubishi decision49 in 1985 the US Supreme Court held that a 
contractual dispute between a Puerto Rican and a Japanese party was arbitrable although the 
contract potentially violated the US Sherman Act and thus American public policy in antitrust 
law. The Supreme Court argued that an arbitration procedure would not violate public policy 
since the Japanese arbitral tribunal would apply the Sherman Act just the same as an American 
court would do. Complementary to the Supreme Court’s decision, the ECJ ruled in the Eco Swiss 
case50 that all courts in EU Member States are obliged to annul arbitral awards that are contrary 
to Art. 81 EC Treaty (now Art. 101 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; TFEU). 
The reasoning was twofold: the ECJ argued that on the one hand antitrust law formed an integral 
part of European public policy, allowing annulment according to Art. 34 para 2(b)(ii) 
UNCITRAL Model Law, and on the other hand a disregard of antitrust law justified refusing the 
recognition and/or enforcement of arbitral awards under Art. V para 2(b) of the New York 
Convention. 
The message to arbitral tribunals involved in both decisions is rather clear: domestic courts 
consider competition law to form an integral part of public policy which has to be respected by 
international arbitration, and any disregard thereof will result in annulment of the award and 
refusal of its recognition and enforcement. However, even if an arbitrator willing to render an 
enforceable award knows only that he has to take into account competition law, the courts’ 
decisions do not give him any further guidance as to how he has to apply competition law, 
namely which rules he has to apply according to what rules of conflict.  
Against the background of this conflict, it must be asked how international arbitral tribunals cope 
with the application of competition law in practice. In order to clarify this matter, we have 
conducted an empirical case-by-case analysis of international arbitral awards.51 This analysis 
reveals that despite all doctrinal difficulties arbitral tribunals are willing and able to apply 
competition law, specifically the ban on cartels as codified in Art. 101 TFEU. In the last 15 years 
there have been numerous cases decided by arbitral tribunals instituted by the Court of 
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) dealing with matters of 
                                                                                                                                                       
Bar to Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards (2002), Recommendation 2(b) rely on “the existence or 
otherwise of a consensus within the international community as regards the principle under consideration.” 
49 See Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
50 See Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v. Benetton International NV (1999). 
51 This analysis was performed by Moritz Renner in preparation of his doctoral thesis. The full results of the study 
are published in Renner, Zwingendes transnationales Recht - Zur Struktur der Wirtschaftsverfassung jenseits des 
Staates, 2011, at p. 92 et seq. 
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competition law.52 The analysis of those cases shows that arbitral tribunals do apply competition 
law provisions in principle. The dilemma of which rules to apply is solved in a rather pragmatic 
manner. Without resorting to any common methodology, arbitrators employ rules from different 
normative levels in order to justify the application of competition law. 
This inconsistency of methodology and the lack of judicial review by an appellate body, 
however, sometimes lead to troubling inconsistencies of arbitral case-law. This can be 
exemplified by two contradictory decisions in rather similar cases: whereas one tribunal held 
that, following the Mitsubishi case and the general consideration that arbitrators “should always 
be concerned about the efficacy of their awards”, Art. 101 TFEU had to be applied to a contract 
even though the parties had chosen New York State law as applicable law,53 another tribunal 
flatly ruled that antitrust disputes were not arbitrable under New York State law – and therefore 
left antitrust law unapplied.54  
Most awards which are concerned with antitrust norms, however, simply take their applicability 
for granted if those rules form part of the law applicable to the contract as a whole.55 If, for 
example, the parties have agreed on Belgian law as applicable to their contract, arbitrators would 
not engage in any further methodological reasoning but simply apply European antitrust law as 
part of the mandatory law common to all EU Member States. Consequently, as this focus on the 
chosen law regime invites parties to escape from strict regulation by choosing the most lenient 
law, arbitral tribunals incidentally use more sophisticated conflict-of-law arguments in order to 
justify an application of European antitrust law even if the parties have chosen the law of a third 
state. However, while in such cases domestic courts would rely on the so called ‘loi de police’ or 
the ‘governmental interest analysis’ method, arbitral tribunals prefer the ‘law as a fact’-
doctrine,56 which allows them to take into account merely the factual effects of mandatory norms 
beyond the chosen law without, however, granting them force of law. For example, an arbitral 
tribunal might refer to force majeure provisions under the chosen law in order to rule that a 
contract infringing European anti-trust law is unenforceable. 
Problems intensify in those arbitration proceedings which allow the decision of conflict by 
amiable composition, i.e. not according to specific rules of law but according to general 
considerations of equity and the customs of international trade. As by choosing this type of 
proceedings the parties have expressed the clear will to exempt their contractual relation from the 
rule of law altogether, arbitral tribunals might argue that consequently the contractual relation 
should not be subject to any national regulatory law, neither. In the line of this argument, the 
only regulatory limit to the parties’ autonomy is transnational public policy as part of the lex 
mercatoria. In this vein, an arbitral tribunal sitting in Switzerland ruled that European antitrust 
law did not form part of transnational public policy.57 Considering the divergent approaches to 
                                                
52 See, e.g. ICC cases no. 6503, (1990), 122 J. DROIT INT’L (CLUNET) 1022-1031 (1995); 7146 (1992), Y.B. 
COM. ARB. XXVI 119-129 (2001); 7181 (1992), Y.B. COM. ARB. XXI 99-112 (1996); 7539 (1995), J. DROIT 
INT’L (CLUNET) 1030-1037 (1996); 7893 (1994), Y.B. COM. ARB. XXVII 139-152 (2002); 8423 (1994), J. 
DROIT INT’L (CLUNET) 1079-1082 (2002); 8626 (1996), J. DROIT INT’L (CLUNET) 1073-1079 (1999); 10988 
(2003), J. DROIT INT’L (CLUNET) 1408-1417 (2006).   
53 See ICC Case No. 8626 (1996), J. DROIT INT’L (CLUNET) 1073-1079 (1999).   
54 See ICC Case No. 7893 (1994), Y.B. COM. ARB. XXVII 139-152 (2002).   
55 See ICC Cases No. 7146 (1992), Y.B. COM. ARB. XXVI 119-129 (2001); 7181 (1992), Y.B. COM. ARB. XXI 
99-112 (1996); 7539 (1995), J. DROIT INT’L (CLUNET) 1030-1037 (1996) ; 8423 (1994), J. DROIT INT’L 
(CLUNET) 1079-1082 (2002); 10988 (2003), J. DROIT INT’L (CLUNET) 1408-1417 (2006).   
56 See Ehrenzweig, Local and Moral Data in the Conflict of Laws, Buffalo Law Review 16 (1966) p. 55; Kay, 
Conflict of Laws: Foreign Law as Datum, California Law Review 53 (1965) p. 47. 
57 See  ICC case no. 6503 (1990), J. DROIT INT’L (CLUNET) 1022-1031 (1995). 
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antitrust law in different jurisdictions, this reasoning is convincing. How to design competition 
law is a highly disputable political question traditionally decided within the democratic decision-
making processes of the constitutional nation-states. For this reason it is to be doubted that 
beyond hard-core cases of anti-competitive behaviour there will ever be universal rules giving 
guidance to arbitrators in the transnational context.58 
 
CONCLUSION	  
To answer the leading question of this article: The world market can reproduce its own 
prerequisites – but to a limited extent only. 
First, it cannot be denied that private ordering is able to substitute for state-organized 
commercial law. However, on the one hand, the tailor-made governance mechanism employed in 
cross-border trade lack the economies of scale that a state-organized private law regime offers as 
safeguarding mechanism for the multitude of relatively unspecific market transactions. On the 
other hand, as private ordering builds on dependency and command-and-control structures and 
thus necessarily implies vertical integration, international market structures suffer from a higher 
level of economic concentration and are more prone to the abuse of dominant market positions. 
Consequently, private ordering as opposed to state-organized commercial law allows cross-
border trade at high costs and little market incentives only. 
Second, as far as the competition law component of the world economic constitution is 
concerned, the example of international arbitration shows that private governance mechanisms 
are able to reproduce constitutional elements to a certain extent, but are still far from a 
comprehensive solution. As shown above, the application of competition law by arbitral tribunals 
suffers from several inconsistencies. Also the development of a comprehensive ‘transnational 
competition law’ seems unlikely due to the different national approaches to antitrust regulation. 
However, this should not block the view from the positive results of our analysis of ICC awards. 
Even if the tribunals’ reasoning may be inconsistent or sometimes not convincing: at least ICC 
tribunals – in the vast majority of cases – are able and willing to apply competition law as soon 
as they decide according to rules of law. It has become clear that arbitration cannot be regarded 
as a governance mechanism generally allowing parties to ‘opt out of regulation’. Already at the 
current point of time, parties agreeing on an arbitration clause have to expect that a tribunal 
resolving any potential conflict in the contractual relation will consider the protection of 
competition as a goal of public interest, even if this runs counter to the ex-ante private interests 
of the parties. Partly this is a result of the fact that from an ex-post perspective, i.e. after a 
conflict has arisen, one party often has an interest in voiding the contract and, therefore, refers to 
the ban on cartels as an issue of public policy. 
Within the European Union, the application of competition law is guaranteed by the jurisdiction 
of the ECJ. Since according to the decision in the Eco Swiss case awards contrary to EU 
                                                
58 Cf. to Kahn, Les principes généraux du droit devant les arbitres du commerce international, Journal du droit 
international (1989) p. 305-327 (317); Idot, Les conflits de lois en droit de la concurrence, Journal du droit 
international (1995) p. 321-341 (328 et seq.); for perspectives cf. to Basedow, Weltkartellrecht : Ausgangslage und 
Ziele, Methoden und Grenzen der internationalen Vereinheitlichung des Rechts der Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, 
1998, at p. 94 et seq. 
19                          PRIVATIZING THE ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION	  
competition law will be annulled by any public court in the Member States of the EU, any 
arbitral tribunal sensitive to the criteria laid down in Art. 35 of the ICC rules will apply 
competition law. Since it is one of the main goals of arbitration to render enforceable awards 
useful to the parties, any award potentially enforceable within the EU will consider competition 
law. As a large part of world trade is at least indirectly connected to the EU and thus might 
involve the enforcement of an award in Europe, the ECJ’s legislation has great impact. If other 
economically powerful jurisdictions were to implement similar rules, the universal application of 
competition law by arbitral tribunals could be put on a more stable foundation. 
Also changes to the procedural rules of international arbitration itself could further enhance the 
uniform application of competition law. In the long run it seems inevitable to push for a more 
thorough publication of awards in order to both allow a broader discussion of arbitral awards and 
enable arbitral tribunals to carve out more consistent decision-making criteria on a case-by-case 
basis.  
The upshot for the development of a more efficient and fair world economic constitution is that 
public players will have to actively support the world market in reproducing its institutional 
prerequisites. While private ordering is able to allow a respectable level of cross-border 
commerce and enforce antitrust law to a certain extent, both the commercial law and the 
competition law element of the current world economic constitution remain under-developed in 
contrast to its domestic role models. In the long run, only further cooperation of national private 
law systems across borders will help lowering the level of vertical integration in international 
trade and thus allow fair market structures. Also, as far as the application of antitrust rules by 
arbitral tribunals is concerned, nation states will have to keep up the pressure on international 
arbitration organisations to apply and enforce competition law.  
	  
